

ORAL HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
INTERVIEW WITH
DR. WALTER KAHOE

BY - CHARLES W. CRAWFORD
TRANSCRIBER - BRENDA MEIER
ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE
MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY

BRISTER LIBRARY

*This book printed
and bound
through a gift
from
Major Ben R.
and Kathleen J. Schultze.*

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY COLLECTION



86273669 OHT 7/27/92



MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARIES


MVC
TC
425
T2
K34x
1971

UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS LIBRARIES



3 2109 00699 6731



A faint, light-colored watermark of a classical building with four columns and a triangular pediment is visible in the background.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

<http://archive.org/details/oralhistoryoften00kaho>



ORAL HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

INTERVIEW WITH DR. WALTER KAHOE

APRIL 26, 1971

BY CHARLES W. CRAWFORD

TRANSCRIBER - BRENDA MEIER

ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE

MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY



TVA

KAHOE WALTER

MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY
Oral History Research Office
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38152



October 13, 1980

TO: Eleanor McKay
FROM: Charles Crawford

We are sending herewith the tape and transcript of my interview in the TVA Project with Mr. Walter Kahoe, completed on April 26, 1971. Mr. Kahoe gave this interview with the understanding it would be a part of the permanent research collection of Memphis State University. Since Mr. Kahoe died before I was able to submit the completed transcript to him and secure a release form, I am releasing the interview for use by this letter.



THIS IS THE ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE OF MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY. THIS PROJECT IS "AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY". THE PLACE IS PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. THE DATE IS APRIL 26, 1971, AND THE INTERVIEW IS WITH DR. WALTER KAHOE, FORMERLY WITH THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY. THE INTERVIEW IS BY DR. CHARLES W. CRAWFORD, DIRECTOR OF THE MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE. TRANSCRIBED BY BRENDA MEIER.

DR. CRAWFORD: Dr. Kahoe, I suggest that we start, though

I know this is well recorded elsewhere, by getting a little biographical information about you. If you will, in whatever outline you wish, sum up something about your life before you became associated with TVA such as perhaps when and where you were born, your education, and your experience before, then we'll get into your work with TVA.

DR. KAHOE: I was born November 21, 1905, in Yellow Springs, Ohio, which is the seat of Antioch College. Actually I was born about a block from the college. My family was living there at the time, and that seemed to be the best place to be born. I, therefore, had a long acquaintance with the college, which was practically moribund at the time that Arthur Morgan came there in 1921 to be President and reorganize it.

My first acquaintance with Arthur Morgan was early in 1922, and later I became a student at Antioch, was a teacher, left for graduate work at

Harvard University for a while, took a master's there, and later completed my Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania.

At Antioch I worked very closely with Arthur Morgan. I don't know that I could say that I was the "teacher's pet", but we always seemed to get along very well, even though we disagreed on a great many things. We had enough sympathy with each other to want to work together.

I went to the TVA largely, I think, because Arthur Morgan was having a very difficult time there, personally, with David Lilienthal, and to a lesser extent with Harcourt Morgan, but particularly with Franklin Roosevelt. And he told me he needed me most of all because he had to have somebody as an administrative assistant that he felt he could trust completely.

DR. CRAWFORD: May we stop a moment here, sir, and go back a bit? Do you remember when you first became acquainted with Arthur Morgan--what impressions did you have of him then; what did you know of him, and what did you think as you did become acquainted with him?

DR. KAHOE: My first impression was that here is a very tall, gaunt person, full of nervous energy, and perhaps interested in me, not so much as a human being, but for what could be made of it. He gave the impression of being very anxious to get on with the remaking of the world. In fact, I suggested to him once that, "the way you wanted to rearrange the physical landscape might sometimes be taken by God as criticism of the way God had left the world". This did not seem to trouble him.

DR. CRAWFORD: What was the nature of your association at Antioch? You were a student, of course, when he was President?

DR. KAHOE: Yes.

DR. CRAWFORD: And did he encourage you to pursue graduate work elsewhere, then to return?

DR. KAHOE: Yes, in fact he looked forward to me as a rather promising prospect for administration and teaching. At the end of my sophomore year I was then on what we used to call the sophomore plateau. I believe it's called an identity crisis or something now, but I decided that I wanted to take a year out of college and go about the country just seeing what it was all about. Everybody thought I was crazy, including my own family, and Arthur Morgan was the only one who was willing to talk it out with me, and said, "Well, perhaps you are right about it. Perhaps that's what you need." He told me then a great deal of his early wanderings when he was a lad--following high school when he went to Colorado and had a pretty miserable time--so I took the year off and worked as a tramp printer and as an itinerant worker in railroad camps, and came back the following year, quite unrepentant about it and with the feeling that I wanted to go on with college. From then on I made what we use to refer to as straight A's and carried about one and a half to two-times the usual number of subjects, and from there went on to Harvard too. So we had enough empathy--Arthur Morgan and myself--to get along in this way.

DR. CRAWFORD: At the time that he went to TVA in 1933,
what was your work at Antioch?

DR. KAHOE: Well, at that time I took over the office
of Dean. Algo Henderson who had been Dean,
was made Acting President, so for three years I was officially Assistant
Dean and Algo was Dean and Acting President. We occupied offices (in fact,
I had Arthur Morgan's old office) during this three-year period, which since
I was practically still in pin feathers as far as the college administration
was concerned, perhaps was pushing me too much.

DR. CRAWFORD: When did he call for you to come to TVA?

DR. KAHOE: Oh, he began talking about it early in 1936.
I had taken, or applied for, a leave of ab-
sence at Antioch in order to go back to Harvard and complete my doctorate.
And when I went to TVA we had to cancel those plans.

DR. CRAWFORD: Let's see. You went there do you remember
what time in '36?

DR. KAHOE: I received my appointment as Administrative
Assistant to the Chairman of the Board on
August 1st and reported for duty the following Wednesday, which was August
5, 1936. These dates are taken from my diary, I think, and can be relied
on.

DR. CRAWFORD: You have kept rather extensive diaries, I
believe?

DR. KAHOE: Yes, although in retrospect, some forty
years afterwards, some of it seems rather

trivial.

DR. CRAWFORD:

What did you find when you first arrived at TVA and how did you approach the situation?

DR. KAHOE:

tellectual and economic climate of 1936. We were still in the depression; we had not gone through it. One of the first things that impressed me was that there had been a great deal of what we referred to in those days as over-hiring; that is, the hiring of people who were much too good for what they were doing and had held much more responsible positions, and were just so glad to have a chance to work on something they believed in; that there was a wonderful team assembled there. I think probably there had not been for many, many years an engineering staff of the uniformly high quality of the TVA.

The TVA was a great adventure. I remember hearing Franklin Roosevelt say once that there were two things in his administration in 1936 that were universally approved: one was the TVA because of what it was doing and the manner it was doing, and the other was the Civilian Conservation Corp, the CCC, for the motivation of what it was trying to do for the young people. This was an unusually humble mood for FDR. I think also when I went there it took me about two weeks to realize that there was a great deal of bickering. There was already a very open quarrel, very well known in the Board, and this ran down just as a tree might start splitting at the top, and you could see the crack running clear to the things. Perhaps I could read a diary entry which I made on September 2, 1936: Wednesday, the 2nd- "Mr. Richards, (this was Ned Richards), Chief Forester, picked me up about 8:30

and drove me out to the tree crop nursery and then into town. We had quite a long talk, during which he expressed his troubles with a remarkable abandon . and eloquence. Some of his points were well taken, and I can see now there is a considerable amount of mutual feuding among the division heads."

On the 5th of September, which was a Saturday, I find the following entry: "Up and go. A. E. M.'s car into Knoxville, giving a CCC boy a lift on the way. Have spent the morning catching up. There is to be a Board meeting at 10 A.M., where I shall probably meet the big, bad wolf, Lilienthal, for the first time. Hope he doesn't bite me. Board meeting was comparatively unexciting. Lilienthal turned out to be a very alert, affable young man. Was struck by the similarity in facial features between him and Arthur Morgan. H. A. Morgan not there.

This is an observation which, as far as I know, no one else ever made, although I made it to a number of people and they agreed. Both had a very thin face, quite alert, (I understand Dave has put on quite a bit of weight since then, but we all tend to do that). He's probably more round-faced, but both of them had this narrow, alert face. I remember remarking to my wife that if pictures were shown to unprejudiced people, they might be taken for relatives.

DR. CRAWFORD: That is an observation which, I believe, has never been made before.

DR. KAHOE: Yes. I've made it to a number of acquaintances and there was an agreement about it that the craniotomies were not dissimilar. One of the things that impressed me very much about TVA was that with all the quarreling, a great deal

of good work was being done. Historically, we've heard a great deal about the struggle, but a great deal of the material treated in board meetings went through very smoothly. The three board members did have a common devotion to the basic principles of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Now, in my position as Administrative Assistant, I was one of the people regularly attending board meetings. The usual makeup of the corps of the board meetings were the three Directors and their Administrative Assistants. I was Arthur Morgan's Administrative Assistant. Forrest Allen was Dave Lilienthal's Administrative Assistant, and Neil Bass was H. A. Morgan's Administrative Assistant. And in addition, the General Manager, who was then John Blandford, attended (usually with an assistant), and the General Counsel, Larry Fly, very frequently attended. An Executive Meeting, of course, which was very rare, was restricted to the three Board members.

To show the general climate in which we were working, I would like to read another extract from my diary. This is on November 12th, or for November 12th.

DR. CRAWFORD: Still 1936?

DR. KAHOE: Still 1936. "Meeting with the Chattanooga Power Board this morning. It was left to Lilienthal to arrange and he invited me to be present, which I appreciated. The Chattanoogans, particularly Colonel Fisk, the Chairman, seemed to feel that our holdup on their contract, while negotiations were proceeding for a power-pool, might indicate the desire to use them as a pawn in the game, and eventually to sell them down the river. This impression is not entirely unfounded, probably. Meeting broke up a little after twelve, without much

accomplished. Luncheon with A. J. Ackerman."

DR. CRAWFORD: That's Adolph Ackerman, isn't it?

DR. KAHOE: Yes, we always called him Acker Ackerman and I never heard him called Adolph. He was called a few other things by Dave Lilienthal, but not Adolph. I'm sorry, that date should have been October 12th. I proceed to November 12th, after apparently a fairly quiet month. November 12th: "Article in the paper today which indicates the A. E. M. had a very successful conference at the White House." Arthur Morgan was apparently in Washington while I was remaining in Knoxville to mind the store, as it were.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did he report to you by telephone?

DR. KAHOE: Very frequently.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did he feel at that time that the President was supporting him?

DR. KAHOE: Yes, apparently at that time, when I talked with him by phone I got the impression that he was feeling that Roosevelt was supporting him. One of the unfortunate things about Roosevelt was (this is personal experience) that the last person who talked with him always seemed to feel that he was getting the decision.

DR. CRAWFORD: I believe he had that facility of making everyone feel that they had his support.

Do you know what Arthur Morgan was seeking from him at that time--what sort of support?

DR. KAHOE: The power pool was the thing that was

coming up at that point--whether we should try to arrange a Southeastern power pool with Commonwealth and Southern, which was one of the things that was, as we used to say, "cooking at the time".

Now, on November 18th I find this entry: "Did not go into work this morning, but stayed in Norris to help A. E. M.. Found him quite discouraged by the apparent change of front on the part of the President. His energies seemed to be at a very low level and his morale even lower. I suggested a few days rest. I came in by courier at noon (meaning to Knoxville) and received a phone call about the middle of the afternoon to the effect that he (A. M.) had decided to slip off to their place in Claremont, Florida." He and Mrs. Morgan had a little refuge down there which they went to occasionally.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did they drive down?

DR. KAHOE: He drove, yes. Resuming the diary entry: "So there was much fluttering of the dove-cote to get a license for his trailer. Out to Norris with Bock (that was Carl Bock) and Ackerman to go over some things with A. E. M.." Apparently there were last-minute things which I had to take out and go over with him. Resuming some entries which indicate the climate in which we were working, I come to December 9th, still in 1936: "Got some work done today." You'll understand if I strain out the personal references of walking the floor with the baby and so on.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes.

DR. KAHOE: "Got some work done today. A.E.M. came in at noon. He had quarrels with the legal division over his refusal to sign the defendant's brief in the 19-company power suit, and with Blandford over things in general." Blandford was the General Manager.

December 23rd, which was a Wednesday: "Board meeting at H. A. Morgan's house this morning, H. A. Morgan being indisposed and unable to come to the office. Several head-on collisions between the Chairman and H. A., unpleasant to all beholders. Lunch with Barton Jones." He was one of the engineers.

DR. CRAWFORD: What, particularly, were the disagreements between the two Morgans about at that time?

DR. KAHOE: I didn't make a note of it. At least, no note appears. In general, H. A. and I got along very well, and I think Arthur felt the H. A. followed Dave's lead. H. A. was an agriculturalist, from Canada; he had been President of the University of Tennessee, and he and I shared enough interest in farming so that off the record we were reasonably friendly, and I got along very well with Neil Bass, his Administrative Assistant. And I will say that H. A. Morgan--Harcourt Morgan--had a single-minded devotion to bettering the lot of the southern farmer. He ate, lived and breathed phosphate fertilizer, and I think would have been quite willing to have had the jurisdiction of the board members divided up like Gaul, into three parts, with A. E. taking care of the engineering, and Dave taking care of selling the power and our relations with the power companies, and he--H. A. Morgan--

being allowed to better the lot of the farmers.

DR. CRAWFORD: Didn't some such division exist, perhaps informally, already?

DR. KAHOE: Never officially, although it had been proposed by Dave that they have this tripartite or really triumvirate, to run things and just meet to compare notes, so to speak. Arthur Morgan never agreed to this, and this was one of the perennial bones of contention with Dave Lilienthal. Dave felt that he should be left alone with the power and, as always, we had arguments about the phase rule or the rate at which the reservoirs should be filled. If you have interviewed as many people, Mr. Crawford, as you tell me, or shall we say since you have interviewed as many people, this must have come up, particularly with the engineers.

DR. CRAWFORD: Flood control versus power needs?

DR. KAHOE: Indeed, yes. And the TVA worried all the time about the constitutionality of the power program. This was later decided overwhelmingly in favor of the power program, but I can remember that we worried about building or purchasing stand-by power in order to prime a great deal of the third-rate power or secondary power. Of course, a reservoir that you are using for flood control and also for production of hydro-power inevitably presents a conflict. For power production you have to have the reservoir full; for flood control you have to have it empty. This over-simplifies the problem, but every February and March there would come this "shall we impound" question. The power engineers wanted to impound the water from then on, but if you filled

the first time in the history of the world, the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

It is a remarkable fact, that the *whole* of the human race, in all its parts, has been gathered together, and is now to be seen in one place.

a reservoir, it ended up completely full about the end of April, and then there came an unseasonably heavy rainfall, you didn't have the storage capacity for it and the water would have to be allowed to go downstream to the great jeopardy of the people who depended on protection. On the other end, if you didn't impound the water and you didn't get the later rainfall, then you would go into the summer with a lower head of water and you wouldn't be able to produce as much prime power. Prime power, as you know, is your most valuable. And we had a very good arrangement where we sold what we classed as dump power to Alcoa, the Aluminum Company of America which could use it for aluminum production, and then shut down when they couldn't have this cheap power available. But if you could build a stand-by steam plant and use that during the summer, you could make a lot of this dump power into prime power, which you needed for residential use, and so on. So I can remember this seemed to be almost perennial. Very few Board meetings went by without some dissension about it.

DR. CRAWFORD: The basic problem is still there because you still have this conflict, of course, between the use of the reservoirs.

DR. KAHOE: Sure you do. Of course, you didn't have the problem in the Miami Conservancy, which was really a flood-control project, because nobody tried to make power. Of course, the power companies had fought the use of the TVA for the production of power. Their interests were menaced, or they thought they were, by it and one of the problems which came up was: "shall the TVA--or should the TVA--sell power to the Commonwealth and Southern for distribution?". And

Arthur always had the feeling that Dave was inciting (might not be too strong a word) municipalities such as Chattanooga and Memphis to condemn the distribution system in the city, and buy it, and then buy their power from us--the TVA--which would just about eliminate the Commonwealth and Southern.

I always had a certain sympathy for Wendle Willkie, of whom I was rather fond. As chairman of the Commonwealth and Southern, which was really a holding company, of course, (They owned Georgia Power and Tennessee Electric Power) he was facing a very considerable threat to their investment. As you know, any power system is made up really of three parts: you have to have something to produce the power and you have to have long-distance, high-tension, high-voltage power lines to transmit it. These are the ones you see running across the country, and they when you get into the city gate, as we called it, you have to have a house-to-house system of lines, and if Commonwealth and Southern had production capacity; that is, generating capacity, and owned the transmission lines across country, and lost the residential market in Memphis, because Memphis bought power from the TVA, then the other part of their system wasn't worth anything. And this, it seemed to me, was a case where the common good would best be served by compromise. In theory, F.D.R. went along with this, but every now and then he would get upset about these robber barons, and then we'd have a hard time about it.

DR. CRAWFORD:

Do you know what influence George Norris had on him about this?

DR. KAHOE:

Well, Norris started out being very much in favor of Arthur Morgan, and later almost unequivocally supported Dave Lilienthal on it, but Norris had been attacked very unfairly and underhandedly by the power trust. They did everything they could to block his reelection every time, and he certainly was not an unprejudiced observer. I mean, after all, when a fellow is shooting at you personally, you do get a certain feeling about him, and this was certainly the case with George Norris, and he couldn't say anything good for the power trust.

DR. CRAWFORD:

Why do you suppose he changed to support Dave Lilienthal rather than Arthur Morgan?

Was it this matter of power companies?

DR. KAHOE:

I always felt it was a great deal that. He thought that Arthur was too soft on this question, and Arthur was always looking for a reasonable way to settle things, and generally I had sympathy for this. Now, perhaps a little later I can return to this.

On December 30th I find an entry which is much more historic than I ever thought it would be--a very trivial entry. It is perhaps a good thing that diaries do for you. Wednesday, the 30th of December: "Work as usual. Spent most of the time reading material concerning marble claims in the Norris reservoir area. Lunch with Felix Reynolds, at which I pointed out some reservations I had." This is the first entry I've made on what became the famous Berry Marble claims which really was the thing that furnished the basis for the actual explosion and Arthur Morgan getting fired

Book Reviews

and the political system. The book is divided into three parts: Part I, "The Political System," Part II, "The Political Process," and Part III, "The Political System and the Political Process."

Part I, "The Political System," is the most comprehensive and detailed section of the book. It covers the political system in general, including its structure, functions, and dynamics. It also discusses the political system in the context of the political process.

Part II, "The Political Process," is the second most comprehensive and detailed section of the book. It covers the political process in general, including its structure, functions, and dynamics. It also discusses the political process in the context of the political system.

Part III, "The Political System and the Political Process," is the third most comprehensive and detailed section of the book. It covers the relationship between the political system and the political process, including their interactions and dependencies.

The book is well-written and clearly organized. The author's writing style is accessible and engaging, making the complex concepts of political science easy to understand.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in political science, particularly those who are interested in the political system and the political process.

some time later.

DR. CRAWFORD: You didn't anticipate the real trouble in this case, did you?

DR. KAHOE: No, I didn't.. And on December 31st: "Busy morning. A.E.M. back about two. (Apparently had been away on a trip.) Board meeting at H. A. Morgan's house. All three directors present; the first time for a long while. Flat conflict on wage policies, very wearing and fatiguing. Home with the Chairman (meaning that I drove home with him)."

DR. CRAWFORD: Did they often hold meetings at Harcourt Morgan's house?

DR. KAHOE: No, these are the only two that I can remember. He had a spell . . . I'll skip some comments on the discouraging European situation, the Spanish Civil War, and resume the diary entry: "Our own TVA is almost bellum omnia contra omnes." I don't know why I remembered to put it in Latin, but it's a war of all, against all. "It rather turns my stomach to see A. M. and D.E.L. shaking hands with apparent cordiality after a month's separation, most of which period was devoted by each to a hardy effort to put the other's hide on the barn door, politically speaking." Perhaps that's something we could take out when I see the thing, but it shows how it affected a youngster.

DR. CRAWFORD: The quarrel was fairly advanced by that time though?

DR. KAHOE: Oh, God, it had gotten its growth almost

before I went there. The next day, which was January 1, 1937, I have this entry: "A.E.M. came over about 8 p.m. this evening, quite depressed by a phone conversation which he had just had with Oswald Garrison Villard of the Nation. Bellard had had a conference with the President, and while he emphasized that F.D.R. had not made up his mind, A.E.M. got the impression that the President was going to support Lilienthal. I felt that the President had already made up his mind, and was just feeling out by this indirect approach to see how much of a fuss A.E.M. was going to make. It's a hell of a way to run a country by beating the devil around the bush this way."

DR. CRAWFORD: Why did you feel the President had already made up his mind?

DR. KAHOE: This was a technique which I saw indirectly. He would put up what we used to call a trial balloon. If nobody groaned too much or shot at it too much, then we would go ahead with it.

DR. CRAWFORD: Why do you think he had changed from loyal support, which I believe he really did give Arthur Morgan in the beginning, to this position?

DR. KAHOE: Well, he was getting a tremendous amount of pressure from the liberal wing, led by Norris, who had a great deal of influence, and many others, and from his cabinet and from people like Ickes and his, I guess it was a secondary cabinet that Rex Tugwell was in, and Morris Cook of the REA.

DR. CRAWFORD: Why did they prefer David Lilienthal though?

DR. KAHOE: Well, partly because David, I think, taught them to prefer him. He spent more time with them and was more affable and I think that they just liked each other more. Felix Frankfurter, at the time, had a great deal of influence on the President, and Dave was his boy. There used to be a joke which I guess is out of season now. The question is: What is the best way to get on the Supreme Court? You go to Harvard Law School and turn left.

DR. CRAWFORD: Do you feel that David Lilienthal (over Arthur Morgan) had an advantage in politicking in Washington?

DR. KAHOE: Oh, yes. He was a cognizant politician. I never saw Dave miss a trick, really.

DR. CRAWFORD: Arthur Morgan, as an engineer, didn't concern himself much with that, did he?

DR. KAHOE: No, he did not, and we would take long trips to inspect the dams. We had a plane (Tom Casterson was the pilot); it was like a cabin plane, quite luxurious for those days. We would leave Knoxville, stop down on the landing strip at Chickamauga Dam at Chattanooga, and go on down and stop an hour at each construction and go over things. I would make notes of things that had to be watched, and then we would come back to the office. But I think engineers very easily get the feeling when the plans have been made and you agree on what you are building and everybody is working out, you don't need to

worry about it.

DR. CRAWFORD: You tend, perhaps, to overlook the personal or the human aspects?

DR. KAHOE: Very much. Oddly enough I remember one trip where we ended up in Memphis, which was not in the TVA area, of course, but it was the best place to put down at night, having made this tour. Just the two of us were having supper at, I think, the Peabody Hotel. Isn't there such a hotel?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes sir, there is.

DR. KAHOE: They used to have ducks that came in.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, they still do.

DR. KAHOE: They are probably not the same ducks because this was a long time ago. And I said to him, "You know, Mr. Morgan, all day we've been stopping and I haven't heard you say a kind word to anybody all day. At each site you've been critical of this, that, and the other. Isn't anything going right on these sites?" (I paraphrase this from memory.) And he said, "Well, I don't think I've been any different today than I usually am." And the next morning at breakfast he brought it up again, which sometimes he would do when it, so to speak, had marinated overnight. And he said, "I think you were right yesterday, but in engineering you don't worry about the things that are going right. You worry about the things that may not be safe, and these people I talk with expect that. They don't expect for me to say, "Well, that concrete looks fine." You spend your time worrying about it, and you worry about what isn't going right."

DR. CRAWFORD: He did well with the people at the construction sites, I believe, but he was being outmaneuvered in Washington, possibly, during this time.


DR. KAHOE: He was, yes.

DR. CRAWFORD: What part did Marguerite Owen play in this?

DR. KAHOE: Marguerite Owen, I met only once, and she was very polite. I always felt that she was far more devoted to Dave Lilienthal than to Arthur Morgan, and I'm not sure that we got word as promptly about things as Dave did at times. This is not to suggest any chicanery or malpractice or misprisions in office, but Arthur felt she was privately inimical. I don't know. She may have just been more sympathetic toward Dave's viewpoint.

On Januray 8, 1937, another diary extract: "Home rather discouraged. Every indication seems to be that the President will back D.E.L., and this will inevitably bring about the Chairman's resignation or dismissal. I should say that the chances of being out of a job next week are about three to one, but somehow I am not greatly worried, personally, although sickened by the thought of what will happen to the TVA, and even more, by what it means concerning Roosevelt's future policies and methods." I don't know why I waxed so philosophical at this point.

On January 10th, which was a Sunday: "Up early, breakfasted, and then to pick up the Fosters, and so to Sequoyah Landing where we got one of the diesel cruisers for a trip to the marble quarry on Central Peninsula. (As Administrative Assistant, I could requisition it.) The boat attendant fell over board, but didn't hurt himself except for the wetting. The quarry may



be involved in the Berry marble claims.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did Arthur Morgan have a firm position toward the Berry claims already, by that time?

DR. KAHOE: Absolutely adamant. Now I would like to say that I wasn't ever quite sure that Berry was a scoundrel. He was certainly a politician, and you might say he had the politician's code of morality; that if you had private information and could see far enough ahead and see where a road was going to be built, it was quite all right for you to take advantage of this. Now, the mineral rights were a great puzzle to me because I grew up in Ohio, where they were negligible except for a limestone quarry now and then, but the practice was if a person wanted to prospect for minerals or anything, you would go around and pay the farmer who owned the land a few dollars, and then you would go to the next one, and a couple of dollars there, and you've got the mineral rights. And, of course, if you found anything of value the contract provided that the owner of the land got a share of the proceeds, but actually buying up mineral rights was pretty much a token sort of thing. It didn't cost you anything.

The expense came in doing the prospecting and opening it up, and we found that Berry had bought up a considerable number of mineral rights. And as far as we could find, (and I went through) these had been bought up about the time of the Chicago convention which nominated Roosevelt for the Democratic candidate. And it was pretty well known, I think, at the time one need not have been very astute to see that the site, not yet named (usually referred to as the Clinch River site or the Cove Creek site) would have a

dam on it and so it would flood a lot of this land. It was rather curious that all of these claims seemed to be in the area that would be flooded, and my judgement, which I relayed to Arthur Morgan, was that instead of hurting these things that actually it would help them because Norris Reservoir would furnish a way of barging this marble down and getting it to a rail-head, and selling it.

But later on George Berry seemed to have a fantastic idea of what he was losing by the flooding of this marble land. Actually there was one small quarry in operation in the Norris Dam area on Central Peninsula, and that was the one I went to look at, but it struck me as a very "God, help us" sort of thing. Tennessee marble is very thin-seamed, you know. Three or four feet is a large one. You know, it's not like the quarries of 100 feet of marble, where you can take monolithic blocks out of it, as you have in Vermont. On the other hand, it was very varied in color. Architects are rather fond of it. They used it for paneling or something of that sort. It's been largely supplanted, I guess, by plastics. At any rate that was the genesis of the Berry marble claims.

On January 14th, a noted entry: "Work at the office mostly on A.M. statement and getting the Morgan's off to Washington. Lunch with Charlie Hoffman. Lilienthal seems to be gaining ground and it looks as though the Chairman is going to be out pretty quickly." What this statement was was apparently so evident to me that I didn't make a note about it. I think it was possibly on the power-pool, which was very much in the foreground then. I suspect that you could find this statement as it was issued to the papers. I suspect it was a rather conciliatory, reasonable

statement, suggesting the advisability of a power-pool in order to protect existing investments. I know we used to get a lot of letters, and I asked Arthur Morgan once, "Does Commonwealth and Southern specialize in widows and retired school teachers to sell stock to, because all these seem to come from people of this sort who need the income, and think it is very unfair that it be ruined?" I suspect Willkie had sent out a letter pointing out how the machinations of the TVA were threatening their life savings. Oh, yes.

Sunday, the 17th: "Statement came out this morning. So far no earthquakes."

DR. CRAWFORD: That's January '37?

DR. KAHOE: January 1937, and Sunday, the 17th of January.

Monday, the 18th of January, 1937: "Worked this morning expectantly. (Apparently I thought there would be something happening.) Found out, on the whole, editorial opinion of the statement was very favorable. Talked with Louise Foster in Washington by phone. A. M. was to have had a talk with Norris this morning, but I have no other inkling of what has happened. Feel better than I felt yesterday, but still feel that Lilienthal and his viewpoint have the upper hand. Don't know what tomorrow will bring forth."

The following day, Tuesday, the 19th: "Worked all day. (I seem to have been an industrious lad in those days, probably met at the office all day.) Editorial comment continues favorable. F.D.R. had appointed a committee of five: Ickes, Healey, McNich, Delano, Cook, to report to him in

about two weeks on federal power policies. This move seems to me rather indecisive, although the newspapers seem to accept it as at least a partial victory for Lilienthal. Felt better about the situation today. I still expect to get thrown out of here soon, but at any rate, we opened up with a broadside on the enemy, and there will be no doubt about why the Chairman is getting fired." Restful climate, it was. (Laughter)

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes.

DR. KAHOE: Do you think this is worth putting in?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes. I think it is. These reactions we do not have anywhere else on record.

DR. KAHOE: Wednesday, the 20th: (This is a three-day sequence apparently.) "Worked all day.

Some more approving letters. No news from Washington. President inaugurated today for his second term and probably too busy to think about TVA. Address was notable for its equitable temper and reasonableness of attitude, however, actions belie it."

February 2nd, Tuesday: "To work as usual. Scrambled around to get Frank Townsley to recall his memo on the Lambert hearing of last Friday because it represented the Chairman's position. Big event of the day was the conference between TVA and Commonwealth and Southern. C&S represented by Wendell Willkie, Yates and Wedock. Meetings ran from 2:30 to 7:30, and were in a series of conferences, sometimes including twelve people and sometimes only the TVA directors and so forth. Willkie was very likable, but does not seem to have Lilienthal's adroitness in maneuvering.

L. (Lilienthal) got him into a bad position and later insisted on issuing a somewhat misrepresentative news release. I'm convinced that Dave did not want to reach an agreement, but did want a dramatic issue." I can supplement this, not from a diary entry.

The real basic issue there was whether we would sell power to Commonwealth and Southern; that is, power generated by TVA, delivered to their transmission lines or on our own transmission lines, to Memphis City gate or other cities where C&S owned the house-to-house distribution system. Willkie, I thought rather stupidly, said that they could not afford to contract the power unless they were guaranteed a monopoly distributing it. He kept making this point, and I remember thinking myself, "Well, I'm not very bright, but I could express what you mean much better than you are expressing it."

DR. CRAWFORD: Monopoly was a bad word.

DR. KAHOE: Exactly. What he meant by it was that he wanted a guarantee from the Tennessee Valley Authority that Commonwealth and Southern, having contracted to buy the power at the generating point at the dam, seeing this, would then be protected in its distribution rights. As he put it, "We can't afford to contract for the power. Then have you come in and sell additional power to Memphis or set up your own distribution system. The power would just be wasted for us, and we will be obligated to pay for it."

What he was really talking was protection on it. And the misrepresentative news story which was in the newspapers when we came out at 7:30 was: "Willkie refuses to deal with the Tennessee Valley Authority unless

the 1990s (Fig. 10b).

Figure 10b shows the difference in the mean bias of the 1990s relative to the 1950s. The difference is

calculated as the difference between the mean bias of the 1990s and the mean bias of the 1950s. The

difference is positive for the 1990s in the central and southern oceans, and negative in the northern oceans.

The difference in the mean bias of the 1990s relative to the 1950s is positive in the central and southern oceans, and negative in the northern oceans. The positive difference in

the central and southern oceans indicates that the mean bias of the 1990s is larger than that of the

1950s in the central and southern oceans. The negative difference in the northern oceans indicates

that the mean bias of the 1990s is smaller than that of the 1950s in the northern oceans.

Figure 10c shows the difference in the mean bias of the 1990s relative to the 1950s. The difference is

calculated as the difference between the mean bias of the 1990s and the mean bias of the 1950s. The

difference is positive in the central and southern oceans, and negative in the northern oceans.

Figure 10d shows the difference in the mean bias of the 1990s relative to the 1950s.

The difference is positive in the central and southern oceans, and negative in the northern oceans. The

positive difference in the central and southern oceans indicates that the mean bias of the 1990s is

larger than that of the 1950s in the central and southern oceans. The negative difference in the

northern oceans indicates that the mean bias of the 1990s is smaller than that of the 1950s in the

northern oceans. The positive difference in the central and southern oceans indicates that the mean

bias of the 1990s is larger than that of the 1950s in the central and southern oceans. The negative

difference in the northern oceans indicates that the mean bias of the 1990s is smaller than that of the

1950s in the northern oceans. The positive difference in the central and southern oceans indicates

that the mean bias of the 1990s is larger than that of the 1950s in the central and southern oceans. The

negative difference in the northern oceans indicates that the mean bias of the 1990s is smaller than

that of the 1950s in the northern oceans. The positive difference in the central and southern oceans

he has a monopoly." What he really wanted was protection in the areas for which he was buying the power, which was quite a different thing. Well, Willkie, of course, corrected and denied this version of it in the next morning's paper, but obviously it quite never caught up. He was in bed, and Judge Wedock, who was a very sharp, stone-faced fellow, tried to get this straightened out, but I think Willkie simply lost the situation. I remember driving home with the Chairman that night, saying: "Well, if Willkie is worth \$75,000 a year to Commonwealth and Southern, I just shudder to think what Dave would be worth to them," because here was Dave getting \$10,000 a year.

On February 5th we got into another perennial hassle. February 5, 1937: "Again a rather quiet day. The morning papers mentioned A. M.'s visit to the White House, but quoted the Chairman as saying: 'We talked chiefly about flood control.' Lunch with Dr. Howard. (I don't remember even who he was now.) D.E.L. called a Board meeting this afternoon primarily to try to get authorization of a broad minute, giving him authority to negotiate with the Aluminum Company of America for power sales. A.M. was reached at the Lee house, and in a three-phone conference, with me on the fourth phone in the outer office, A.E.M. declined to recognize it as a Board meeting. D.E.L., much disgruntled, called a Board meeting for 3 P.M. Monday next. I accepted notice of the meeting, and afterwards phoned A.M. of said notice. (I mean they had to deliver the notice to me as his representative.) Home at the usual time feeling pretty well tired out."

Saturday, the 6th: "A. M. phoned a long memo this morning. Worked on its phraseology and delivered it to H. A. M., D. E. L., and Blandford about noon and then went home. (This was a Saturday.) In it A. M. gave his reasons for wanting to be represented in the negotiations and pointed out that he thought that power sales ought not to be considered or negotiated independently of our taking over the aluminum company site at Fontana on the Little Tennessee River since a dam there would eventually be very important in the unified control of the Tennessee. After getting the memo off, I went home, hoping for a little peace. Tried to get a nap, but was interrupted by an apologetic phone call from Blandford, the General Manager, who said that he had talked with H. A. M. concerning my memo, (Off the record, it seemed to become my memo.) and that H. A. M. intended to proceed with the meeting, so I wired to that effect to A. M. and went back to sleep. Next interruption was a phone call from Louise Foster concerning my wire. I confirmed it and in return was told of Morris Cook's resignation as head of REA. It is not yet public. By this time . . ."

Apparently family problems.

Sunday, the 7th: "Up late. Another call from Blandford to apprise me of an exchange of telegrams between A. E. M. and H. A. M. . A. M. wired to the effect that he was unable to call a meeting in Knoxville on Monday since he was detained in Washington on official business. I suggested a meeting in Washington. H. A. M. wired back to the effect that at the Friday meeting notice had been given and time set for the meeting on Monday, so there the matter rests, but not quietly."

DR. CRAWFORD: What day was this?

DR. KAHOE: This was Sunday, the 7th. It was just a weekend, you see, but not too quiet a one.

DR. CRAWFORD: Was the meeting held?

DR. KAHOE: Let's see. Monday, the 8th: "Busy day. The Board meeting about the aluminum contract went off quietly, at least superficially, since D. E. L. said that in deference to A. E. M.'s protest, he would defer negotiations."

Friday, the 12th of February, 1937: "Work as usual. Board meeting at 2:30. Almost as soon as it started D. E. L. asked for an executive session to discuss the action of Ackerman in talking with representatives of the aluminum company in Washington last week. He claimed that this was open insubordination inasmuch as the Board officially terminated such negotiations on June 2, 1936. All of us but the three directors were excused, being called back about 3:15 to proceed with routine business. Don't know what happened in Ack's case, but I think he is to blame for getting us into a bad position, even if not guilty of insubordination." These illustrate the climate that we were working in. Ackerman was an engineer and officially responsible only to the Chairman, who was chief engineer also.

DR. CRAWFORD: I believe he has since gone to Wisconsin.

DR. KAHOE: He went to Drava, and then he went to Wisconsin as a consultant, I think, and is doing very well. Ack was a smart engineer, pig-headed in a lot of ways, as I have often told him, but a likable person. Perhaps this is not the thing, but it does give an impression of the climate in which we were work-

ing at the time.

DR. CRAWFORD: I think this is what we could not get any other way.

DR. KAHOE: Well, I think that's true, but that doesn't prove that you want it.

DR. CRAWFORD: I think it illustrates a great deal.

DR. KAHOE: Well, here's a passage which I will read.

Tuesday, February 23rd: "To work as usual and had an incredibly tiring day. When I ended up, I was just as depressed physically and mentally. Drove home with A.M., having sent my own car out with the driving group. A. E. M. also down in the dumps and I not in the shape to elevate him. Went to bed shortly after dinner. I do not see how the TVA can continue to exist as a house divided. A number of people in the organization are already sick of the situation. It seems to me that the morale has been lowered greatly, even in the past six months. The President will not or cannot move in the matter, and within the TVA, the shepherds starve, while the wolf steals the sheep. Our hopes, or rather the Chairman's hopes of last Wednesday seem to have gone to join the many others in limbo. In my present humor, it is easy to see how people go in for drinking, opium, and so forth." I don't know that they did.

Wednesday, the 24th: "To work. Long awaited meeting concerning marble claims in Norris Reservoir was held this afternoon at 2:30. Major George L. Berry and his associates, the claimants, met with the Board. The meeting was less of a brawl than I had expected. Berry, a born stuffed-shirt in my opinion, made his 'claim for justice'." D. E. L. and H. A. M. had al-

ready, last July, signed an agreement to employ Dr. John Finch of the Bureau of Mines to appraise the claims. A. E. M. objected to this on the grounds that the physical value was unimportant inasmuch as Berry was an official of the federal government, that he was asking an enormous sum-- \$1,600,000--for an investment of perhaps \$5,000 from another federal agency, and that an agreement to conciliate might imply a disregard of possible improprieties. Everybody is to sleep over it and a decision is to be reached at a Board meeting tomorrow. After the meeting A. E. M., Bock, Ackerman and I drew up a memo of the Chairman's reasons for objecting. Home with the Chairman about 7, very tired, but felt better than I expected to feel after the Berry meeting."

Thursday, the 25th: "Meeting this morning. H. A. M. and D. E. L. outvoted A. E. M., and so by Board majority action, we are to proceed with conciliation." This was one of the cases, not as common as you might think, where the Board Chairman was outvoted two to one. Usually you didn't get to a vote if the other two objected, you see.

DR. CRAWFORD: I assume there would have been more votes.

Did Arthur Morgan consider this just a matter of principle that the Berry claims not be dealt with, not be conciliated?

DR. KAHOE: Well, Arthur Morgan had and has an inveterate propensity for seeing a moral issue in everything. He is just that way and I know I have had many personal discussions with him. I remember once at Antioch he took the position

that if drinking coffee was bad for you physically, then you ought to stop it because it wasn't a question of degree as long as it was a moral issue. I remember I said I could see quite a difference between drinking coffee and committing murder, for example. While I wasn't a theologian, I saw a very good reason for the distinction between venial and mortal sins.

DR. CRAWFORD: His tendency to see moral issues in things involved him frequently in controversy that could have been avoided, didn't it?

DR. KAHOE: Oh, yes. Yes, and now I remember he reported to me once on a conversation he had had with F.D.R.. F.D.R. was a politician; he was a statesman too; he had a great mind and I think post World War II history might have been different if Roosevelt had survived. It was very unfortunate that he died at the time that he did. But the question came up on the Berry claims, and they were discussing them, and F.D.R. said, "Well, if a person knew that a new subway was to be built along a certain street and knew it from an official position, you can hardly make a campaign issue of the fact that he bought a piece of property and made a little money out of it." And I think F.D.R. was inclined to conciliate Berry on these marble claims; that is, he might have said, "Well, if you can settle the thing for \$100,000 (I think was the figure), why don't you settle it, and don't have an uproar about it." But Arthur Morgan wouldn't have given him \$5 if he felt he wasn't entitled to it, you know.

DR. CRAWFORD: He was very stubborn where he saw a moral issue.

DR. KAHOE: When he saw a moral issue, you could not budge him.

DR. CRAWFORD: How much political influence . . .

DR. KAHOE: I never tried to budge him on a moral issue; I just tried to get him to see that some issues were more important than others. No, in my biography of him, I point out a few of these cases.

DR. CRAWFORD: How much political influence did Berry have?

DR. KAHOE: He had quite a bit, and if I could read something which may make me want to seal these for a while, I'll do it.

DR. CRAWFORD: Certainly.

DR. KAHOE: I think this is known really to very few people. Dave Lilienthal suspected it because Dave was no fool, whatever he was, and he never blamed me for it because he would have done exactly the same thing if he had been in the position for it. (Laughter) It's a good thing I didn't throw these away.

DR. CRAWFORD: It's a very valuable record.

DR. KAHOE: Friday, April 30th, (1937 understood): "An exciting day. Resume"--Last week Senator Nathan Bachman of Tennessee died of heart failure in Washington. This left a vacancy in the senate to be filled by an appointment made by Governor Gordon Browning. The vacancy has been keenly contested. One of the strong-

est contenders, the Major George L. Berry, the same Berry who has the prodigious claims before the Board for marble leases in the TVA. Berry has apparently very skillfully planted the rumor that F. D. R. wants him to receive the appointment. This leaves the President in a very vulnerable position since the matter of the marble claims is now a matter of public record through publication of our TVA hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations. This morning Charles West (West must have been the secretary of F. D. R.. I don't place him now.) phoned the Chairman to suggest that A.E.M. let Berry's vulnerability on the marble lease be known to Browning. Rather than risk sending material, I volunteered to go, taking the material and bringing it back. George Foster and I left about 2:40; arrived in Nashville at 6:40; had dinner and had to wait until about 9:40 to see the governor. Left our TVA car down town and taxied out to the gubernatorial mansion. Governor affable and apparently grateful to us for our efforts to keep him informed. Foster was present. A conversation of perhaps half an hour resulted in the exchange of the following information:

A. From us to Browning--a cursory or a delineation of the marble claims and probable early publicity; B. From Browning to us--the confirmation of a conference with the President on Tuesday, (2) application of Cordell Hull for the job and appointment withdrawn at the President's request, (3) F.D.R.'s opposition to Berry for the appointment, (4) Browning's dilemma, on the one hand to alienate Berry, and on the other to displease the President and run the risk of being involved in the probable scandle with Berry. As the governor expressed it: "I pulled the President's chestnuts out of the fire on the whole, and I think they should get Berry to withdraw." We finished

with mutual felicitations, declined a polite and perfunctory invitation to stay overnight, and posted homeward. My own mind was much awhirl at the ways of presidents, governors, and would-be senators. George drove all the time and got us home at about 3 a.m. Saturday morning." Perhaps as background I should say that Cordell Hull, who was then Secretary of State, was disagreeing with F.D.R. (some circus) and wanted to get out of the cabinet, but he wanted an official position. This was perfect for him. Cordell Hull, was a Tennessean, was eligible for the appointment and that's what he wanted. The president did not want him to resign--did not want a rift in his cabinet--and above all, I think, did not want Cordell in the Senate with senatorial immunity to attack his foreign policy on certain things.

DR. CRAWFORD: And it was probably much better for Cordell Hull's reputation, historically, in the long run that he did remain and serve in the cabinet.

DR. KAHOE: God, he knows. Berry was also a resident of Tennessee, by the way, and was eligible for the appointment. He was quite a power as the head of the Pressman's Union, and was very active in union work--was quite a power in Tennessee politics. I took George Foster with me because he could be trusted to keep him mouth shut, and also he was a good driver, and I did not want to talk to the governor and show him documents without having a witness that I had not maligned Berry, and so on.

DR. CRAWFORD: Arthur Morgan, of course, was aware of all this?

DR. KAHOE: He sent me.

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes. David Lilienthal may have suspected it, then?

DR. KAHOE: He may have, but he never said anything to me, even afterwards. I suspect he thought it, but when I was at Harvard and the congressional hearing was just starting I received a postcard. I don't know whether I still have it or not, but apparently they were building up a record on both sides, looking forward to the first hearing, and the postcard came from Muscle Shoals, as I remember it, which is not in Tennessee, of course, but in Alabama, on the Tennessee River. And the postcard was a very crude drawing of a bag with a rip in the side of it, and sitting outside the bag was a cat, and I interpreted this to mean that John Neal at Muscle Shoals knew who it was who had gone and seen the governor. (Laughter)

DR. CRAWFORD: But you were never sure of that?

DR. KAHOE: Never sure, but it was rather cryptic. As a matter of fact, at that time I didn't care. Let's see, Friday, May 7th: "A very exciting day. First of all, the news of the explosion of the dirigible Hindenburg at Lakehurst, New Jersey (a tie in with other history). Second, the announcement of the appointment by Governor Browning of Major George L. Berry as U. S. Senator from Tennessee. This stuck in my craw and left the Chairman gasping with indignation and fuming to do something. Ackerman and I went to Norris and managed to persuade him that it was out of his bailiwick to issue a public

statement attacking Berry, and the appointment would only make the matter worse. C. A. Bock threw his weight in the same direction. A.E.M. talked with a number of people in Washington and seemed to come around to the same view, and so the matter rests at the present moment--3 p.m.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, in the time that we have left, Mr.

Kahoe, what would be best to try to cover? You are involved so closely in so much of this that I would like to talk with you again at another interview, sometime in the future, if we can arrange that.

DR. KAHOE: Do you think it would be a good idea if I gave you the resume' of what happened after this?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, I think it would.

DR. KAHOE: That was May 7th. We had a very stormy summer, politically speaking, and I was offered and accepted a Rockefeller research grant in public administration, which was tenable for a year at Harvard University. The obvious reason for it was that they were setting up the curriculum and they were trying to draw people with some academic background and also government experience, to work on the course of studies there. It was then called the Littauer School. So I talked this over with Arthur Morgan and he advised me to take it--to accept it.

DR. CRAWFORD: Do you know why you were offered that-- who recommended you, and so forth?

DR. KAHOE:

I don't know. I imagine the Chairman did, and people had been down, off and on, from the Rockefeller Foundation, and I think they made the first approach to me. It never occurred to me that I would want a fellowship in public administration because my field was philosophy, metaphysics, but it seemed a good thing, and I had been to Harvard before and it seemed I could possibly finish up my dissertation. I was stupid enough when I was there the first year--one year before I married--to get my master's and pass my prelims for the doctorate in one year, but this did me no good because I did not have the residence requirement, which was a minimum of two years at Harvard, and I could satisfy the residence requirements at least and possibly do some work on my dissertation and complete it after I had left, probably after the second year. As it happens, I left (and I can give you the exact date) before the end of the school year. I had to resign the fellowship, and I know Stacy May gave me quite a bawling out about it. He was with the Rockefeller Foundation, and I really felt by going I might be able to save part of the TVA's program. And I think, almost as much as anybody then living, I had some influence with Arthur Morgan, particularly if I could talk him out of this blast, and I was the one who did it because Ack was an engineer and so was Carl Bock. They helped, but I was the one that worked the thing out. Now this is still running, I know, but (long pause)

• • •

Perhaps this would be an interesting item to read. This is Tuesday, July 27th, which was part of the stormy summer that we passed. Tuesday, the 27th of July, 1937: "Went in with the Chairman about 9:30. Chairman

is apparently of the opinion that he should resign. The only question in his mind seems to be when and how. Home at the usual time, the Chairman having gone home earlier in the afternoon."

DR. CRAWFORD: He was feeling at that time that he should resign?

DR. KAHOE: Yes, it was just a question of when he would resign. He felt very definitely.

Then on Thursday, the 29th of July, I have this entry: "Into work as usual. Most exciting thing that happened today was at this afternoon's Board meeting. All three directors were present. Blandford, without warning, proposed the appointment of a committee to consider and recommend candidates for the position of Chief Engineer." Off the record, as an arbitrary dictum, A.E. had resigned as Chief Engineer. It was his position, and we were going to appoint a new one who could take care of more of the detail. "The Chairman objected on the grounds that this procedure had not been used for any other appointments made in the reorganization, and that this method seemed designed to detour Bock, who was a logical candidate for the appointment. Blandford, Clapp and D.E.L. all expressed their offense at A.E.M.'s suspicious attitude. The resolution was passed by two-to-one vote. The discussion was short, but acrimonious. Meeting broke up shortly afterward. It looked like a put-up job to me. Blandford might at least have given A.E.M. some advance notice. I was watching D.E.L. when his copy was given to him (copy of the memo apparently). It seemed to me that his inspection of it was perfunctory and suggested prior knowledge. This two-to-one voting

trust is sure a whiz for efficiency. A.M. and I came home a little early. The move is a hard one to counter. It obviously seems a mechanism for short-circuiting Bock. I think that the bait of the Chief Engineership has been dangled before Parker, and he has risen to the bait, which is indeed an attractive one. The counter, if any, to the move is not very obvious. If we protest before the committee decides on Parker, we seem to be in the position of being afraid to let a committee review Bock's qualifications. If we keep still for the present and then protest, we shall be in a position of acquiescing in the work of the committee, and then protesting only after it becomes obvious that our candidate wasn't going to win."

DR. CARWFORD: How was that settled?

DR. KAHOE: I don't think it was settled during my stay there. And it did come to a head by December, so that I think Parker eventually became Chief, but Bock left when the Chairman did, or was really frozen out.

So, I went to Harvard.

DR. CRAWFORD: You went to Harvard in the summer of 1937?

DR. KAHOE: No, in about mid-September. Actually while I was at Harvard a lot of the people in government there made it a business of trying to pump me about what was happening at the TVA. I kept very carefully quiet on it, although I was in quite frequent touch with Knoxville, and Arthur Morgan came up to see me several times during this period. On the second of March, 1938: "This morning the papers carried an announcement of the verdict which greatly

elated me. I assume that the Chairman will now release his statement which should be all ready for release." (I had gone over the statement with him.)

Thursday, the third of March, 1938: "As I expected, the morning papers carried a statement by the Chairman. The New York Times printed the whole statement. This seems to make an investigation of some sort imperative. The evening papers reported some agitation in Congress today, calling for an investigation of the whole TVA."

Friday, the fourth of March: "There continues to be some agitation for a hearing on the TVA, but it now looks as though it may get shunted to the Federal Trade Commission, which would be far from satisfactory from the Chairman's viewpoint, since it would not be a complete investigation."

Saturday, the fifth of March: "Late today the President released a statement by H.A.M. and D.E.L. labeling A.E.M. as a poor sport and obstructionist, and calling on him to resign. It made no reference to the Chairman's accusations in the Berry matter. From the fact that F.D.R. released the statement, it would seem that he also wants A.E.M. to resign, but neither cares nor dares to be in the position of firing him, apparently for protecting the Federal Treasury from Berry's raid, or attempted raid. No action yet taken on a hearing, but the administration is apparently making every effort to head off a full investigation by an impartial committee."

Sunday, the 6th: "Up early to get in the paper. D.E.L. has pulled a rabbit out of the hat by issuing an offer to buy the public utility property in the TVA region. This may divert attention still further from the

Chairman's charges. To some extent, it represents a concession to the Chairman's position, and thus steals his thunder." This was the position that Arthur Morgan had taken all along--that we ought to buy these properties at an impartially fixed price.

Monday, the 7th: "This morning's paper carried another blast from A.M. in the form of a letter written to Congressman Maverick some time ago, and now released. From the remarks at Harvard, it seems that A.E.M. is going to be blamed as a headstrong person who, even if he has some justification for his statements, should have arranged to wash TVA's dirty linen less publicly. People in general have no comprehension of the Chairman's efforts to secure redress without publicity. At present I do not see how anyone can gain from the present situation or how the TVA in the concept of regional administration in general can escape serious damage."

Saturday, the 12th: "Worked this morning. Had a wire from A.M. this afternoon asking me to spend Monday and Tuesday at The Commodore in New York. Very much worried. There is to be another conference at the White House next Friday." And that was the one which was pretty much historical--I think he got fired. Now we can go on with this if you wish to, and the fact that I was embarrassed, but not publicly, during the hearing one time when notes which I took in a conference with Berry the first time. There had been an agreement that this would just be a gentleman's conference and nobody would take notes, but for some reason I wasn't a gentleman or didn't hear this statement, so I did take notes. I wrote under the table, you know, and someone--not I--gave these to Congressman Wolverton, and when Berry was before the congressional hearings, these were being read. Berry

said, well, he didn't come in here to be thrown out on his backside, because he had a very justified complaint. And Wolverton read this from the meeting, and the fellow next to me (unknown to me) leaned over and said, "Well, at least he could have said on his derriere." (Laughter) And Berry got sore about it and wanted the ~~minutes~~ impounded, but Wolverton, of course, had immunity.

Well, now your time is running short, sir.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, let's try to sum up a few things about this, Mr. Kahoe. You were away from the scene, of course, during part of your year at Harvard?

DR. KAHOE: Right.

DR. CRAWFORD: What time did you leave there to return? Was it March of '38?

DR. KAHOE: I forgot how I number these things. Sunday, March 13th: "The TVA departed from the front pages temporarily. Papers full of the German seizure of Austria."

Monday, the 14th: "Waiting for phone call from Ackerman, who is also here in New York, ostensibly at least, on business for his firm."

Tuesday, the 15th of March: "Up early and breakfast alone. The coffee at The Commodore is as strong as any I've ever had. (So obviously I was in New York) Worked with Ruth (that would have been Ruth McGee Falck) and Castles (who was a lawyer from Chicago) and later in the morning to see Stacy May at the Rockefeller Foundation. May was troubled about the Chairman's defiance of F.D.R. last Friday. We agreed that I should suspend my fellowship if I became actively engaged in preparing A.E.M.'s case for him."

I was up in the world. (Laughter)

DR. CRAWFORD: And you did choose to do that?

DR. KAHOE: "Back to the hotel and to a luncheon which included Ralph Rounds, Clarence Pickett, Castles, Mrs. Camp, Truman Safford, Birmingham, A.E.M., Granville Clark and myself. They discussed the situation, and among the lawyers there seemed to be a consensus of opinion that A.M. would have to refuse to submit his evidence to the President, but do it as politely and non-defiantly as possible. I left the meeting early and caught the 3 p.m. train to Boston

DR. CRAWFORD: So you had decided by that time, or almost decided to leave Harvard?

DR. KAHOE: Yes. Thursday, the 17th: St. Patrick's Day, but it failed to stir any Irish in me.

Friday, the 18th of March: "Newspapers carried only brief notice of today's conference at the White House. A.M. seems to have continued or to have been maneuvered into the position of continuing his defiance of the President. F.D.R. called him guilty of contumacy, and gave him 72 hours or until Monday at 1:30 to make his final decision about whether or not to admit the jurisdiction of the President's hearing."

Monday, the 21st: "TVA again moved to the front page, but apparently not to conclusion. A.M. still refuses to participate in the Presidential hearing and challenged the power of the President to remove him. The President was wroth, but gave the Chairman a reprieve until 2:30 p.m. tomorrow. A.M. used this reprieve by going to Yellow Springs, according to this evenings paper."

Tuesday, the 22nd of March: "President ousted A.M. today and promoted H.A.M. to Chairman of the Board. A.M. left for Yellow Springs last night and arrived there this morning. President's action was taken shortly after 2:30 p.m. today at which time his ultimatum expired. Evening papers full of pro and con comments as to whether F.D.R. had the right to remove the Chairman."

Wednesday, the 23rd: "Found waiting a letter from A.M., written after the Monday conference and mailed on the train to Yellow Springs. About 3:30 received a wire from A.M. in Chicago, asking me to spend the day in New York and then go to Chicago for an indeterminate period. Financial problems very pressing. (My personal ones too.) Henry Redding showed up and lent me \$10 plus a \$300 check, which eased the financial crisis. I took the 12:30 train for New York, then went back to my second meeting with Stacy May. He's very critical of the position taken by A.M. in defying the President. I tried to convince him that A.E.M. has some reason on his side, but it's hard to put a good case forward. He said that I should resign my fellowship if I went with the Chairman, taking my chance of reappointment. I did not resign then, but told him I would write in a few days. Back to the hotel and caught the 4:20 p.m. to Chicago." So I was in it then, and I later resigned. The next couple of diaries cover our work and how we financed our hearing.

DR. CRAWFORD: In your work with Arthur Morgan in preparing for the hearing, what assistance did you try to give him?

DR. KAHOE: Well, I read everything that he wrote, I

think, and took care of newspaper relations and had to watch finances.

DR. CRAWFORD: Did you help him direct policy--make decisions?

DR. KAHOE: I suppose as much as anybody did.

DR. CRAWFORD: What, after his ouster, did you do? What were your future plans?

DR. KAHOE: Well, we worked together for about a year. I didn't have any job. I was out of a job at Antioch. They had asked me to resign so that they could make a permanent appointment to my position in philosophy, and I did. The understanding was that there always would be a job there for me, but that just didn't work out, you know? And I started and ran a magazine for a while. It was a flop, financially at least.

DR. CRAWFORD: What was the magazine, sir?

DR. KAHOE: It was called The Golden Door. It was a reprint magazine, with comments, and designed to furnish better reading matter than had already been published, you know? They are quite rare now, I understand. It never had a large circulation, and then the Second World War started, and from there I came here.

DR. CRAWFORD: Well, I know that our time is getting short for now. What reading will you suggest for scholars who want to understand more about Arthur Morgan's personality and his leadership?

DR. KAHOE: Well, with a complete lack of modesty I think the book I'm now working on would do as much to give an introduction to it because it's a third party thing, but I think of his own writings, the first ten years of Antioch Notes, which was a semi-monthly publication--not quite that. It was published about twenty times a year--skipped the summer months. It went to a very large reading list.. I helped to print it and occasionally correct it, and a great deal of his philosophy is embodied in that. There is an interesting story, which I probably will repeat in my biography, that when Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated . . . in March, '33, wasn't it?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes.

DR. KAHOE: He very shortly called Arthur Morgan in for a conference and offered him the position at the TVA. At that time, so Arthur told me, the Chairman was to get \$10,000 and the other two directors to get \$9,000. But Arthur Morgan didn't want it that way because he felt it made them unequal and it ought to be a real three-man effort. As it turned out, that was a foolish thing to do because that extra \$1,000 would have been worth much more than \$1,000.

DR. CRAWFORD: It would have been symbolic, I suppose?

DR. KAHOE: Symbolic. But Arthur Morgan at that time said, "Well, I've been committing political suicide twice a month for the past ten years because I've been saying what I think about things," and Franklin Roosevelt took out a copy of Antioch Notes, and he said, "This is what made me acquainted with you." And that's

the way Arthur Morgan's name occurred to President Roosevelt. This is a very good thing for anybody to read, and many of his assembly talks were printed. I was running a little publishing business myself before I was graduated from college (even a bachelor's degree) and made a collections--an anthology--of these notes, and eliminated the duplication and arranged them under headings. And that book, too, is very scarce now, but it's the best resume' of those ten years.

DR. CRAWFORD: I hope it will be reprinted.

DR. KAHOE: Well, a number of them have been done, and Clarence Leuva has just done a book on Arthur Morgan. I didn't give you the exact title of it, but I think it was Arthur Morgan: A Study of his Sources of Creativity.

DR. CRAWFORD: What was the name, sir?

DR. KAHOE: Clarence Leuva--L-e-u-v-a. He's reitred professor of psychology at Antioch, and it's rather a different sort of thing, probably not as intimate as what I would do.

DR. CRAWFORD: Floyd Reeves has recommended the Antioch Notes very highly. Apparently they influenced him.

DR. KAHOE: Is Floyd Reeves still living?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, he has just retired finally. I believe he is 81 this year.

DR. KAHOE: Yes, he's quite a bit older than I.

DR. CRAWFORD: Retired at Michigan--East Lansing, and is

is there now.

DR. KAHOE: Well, you've talked with Al Joe Henderson?

DR. CRAWFORD: No.

DR. KAHOE: He is professor of education at the University of Michigan now, I think. He never knew the TVA, but he knew Arthur Morgan, of course, at Antioch.

DR. CRAWFORD: Why do you think Arthur Morgan was the outstanding person that he was?

DR. KAHOE: That's very hard to answer in a sentence or two.

DR. CRAWFORD: It requires a book, perhaps?

DR. KAHOE: Well, yes, and it's hard to answer in a couple of hundred pages, but it's partly because he had a complete concentration on what he regarded as important. In many ways, Arthur Morgan has as wide a breadth of interest as anybody I've ever known in my life, and he has a germinal mind--a seminal mind--that some people have; that is, we could discuss things quite philosophical and his mind would range right along with me. He had curious gaps in his knowledge, which is quite common with a largely self-educated person. You see, he had only at most, a semester of college work, but I can remember when we would go on a walk Sunday morning when we lived in Norris. It seemed to be a relaxation for him, and I remember one morning I threw in a question like this: "If you had money and weren't opposed to an indefinite tie-up of property and there were no mortmain, what would you invest it

in so that it would always be worth a great deal to your descendants?"

Come up and talk. We both came up with the theory about the only really safe investment would be beautiful spots of land or beautiful sites which could always be used for homes. For example, you put it in power plants--well, we very obviously are going to have atomic energy at some time. If you put it in food, well, we probably have photosynthesis worked out, so this wouldn't be any problem. Transportation was quite uncertain and would probably be a public monopoly, but one thing that people throughout history had always admired--Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians--were beautiful places to live; salubrious and serene. And I found out years afterward, when I went to a little town, Taormina, that from Phoenician times, on, it had been prized as a place for a village, you know, and there are places all through Italy that way. There never would be any over-supply of this because, as we agreed, they weren't building anymore places like this. God stopped creating them at the seventh day of creation, but that sort of thing.

Well, he was a very broad minded person, but I collected stamps. Well I still do, but I don't get time to work on it. I mentioned it casually that I had been arranging some stamps, and he said, "You know, I think that is about as stupid a way to spend your time as you could find." And I laughed, and I said, "Well, you know, the great white father in Washington is an ardent stamp collector." He said, "Yes, I know, and I just can't understand it." He was vexed about this, you know.

Well, he alternately had some of the broadest interests. Otherwise, you have a certain surprise. I think he considered my knowledge of science

fiction a sure sign of a mis-spent reading program. On the other hand, later he and I worked together on a biography of Edward Bellamy, who wrote Looking Backward. He got quite interested in it, but he let me read the science fiction part of it--fantasy part of it--and report on it. And Bellamy wrote a good deal of science fiction. In fact, Looking Backward is a form of utopian science fiction, so he looked on it as distrusted pleasure, although he never would admit this. And I remember once he said to me, "Well, there might have been some excuse for drinking beer in your earlier days because you could get at least certain food values out of it, but now you can take tablets." And I laughed and I said, "Well, this epitomizes a great deal of what I've always said about your attitude about pleasure. You distrust it." (Laughter) And yet he enjoyed seafood very much. I remember if we weren't eating a dinner down at one of the waterfront restaurants in Washington, (and he was enjoying this seafood dinner, as I say, almost sinfully). But he would say, "If everybody could have a meal like this now and then, we wouldn't have any goiter." And I would say, "You're just excusing your carnal enjoyment of it."

DR. CRAWFORD: A very remarkable person. I look forward to reading what you have to write.

DR. KAHOE: He is a very remarkable person.

